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I. Introduction 
In January 2013, Linda Greenhouse published a comment2 in 
the New York Times marking the 40th anniversary of Roe v. 
                                                                                                     
 1. This Article is an expanded version of a talk I presented on November 
7, 2013 at the “Roe at 40—The Controversy Continues” Symposium at 
Washington & Lee University School of Law. An earlier version of the paper was 
presented on May 31, 2013 at the annual conference of University Faculty for 
Life. I am grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for the invitation to 
participate and for their gracious hospitality. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. 
 2. See Linda Greenhouse, Misconceptions, N.Y. TIMES, OPINIONATOR (Jan. 
23, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/mis 
conceptions/?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing how perception of the 
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Wade.3 In the course of the comment, Greenhouse made the point 
that almost no one ever reads the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.4 
I think there is a lot of truth to that observation. Roe has become a 
symbol—it was a great victory for women’s rights, it was an 
important part of a cultural transformation, it is perhaps the 
leading example of judicial excess, it is a manifestation of the 
culture of death. But I think it is true that people do not read the 
actual decision very often anymore.  
After reading Greenhouse’s comment, I did re-read Roe v. 
Wade carefully. That re-reading of Roe v. Wade was a valuable 
experience. Scholars, and not just pro-life scholars, know that the 
opinion is deeply flawed.5 Re-reading the opinion, from a 
perspective of forty years, makes that even more apparent. Yet, I 
came away from that re-reading with a renewed confidence that 
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade will ultimately be overturned. 
In this Article, I will explain my reaction to this re-reading of Roe 
v. Wade.  
II. The Opinion in Roe v. Wade 
A. Weaknesses 
I will begin with a few observations about the opinion. Most of 
the defects in Roe v. Wade were apparent from the very beginning 
and were explored in critical articles by John Hart Ely,6 Richard A. 
Epstein,7 and many others8 in the immediate aftermath of the 
                                                                                                     
Roe v. Wade decision has morphed over time) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 4. See Greenhouse, supra note 2 (“To read the actual opinion, as almost no 
one ever does . . . .”). 
 5. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All 
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1011 (2003) (“Roe’s reasoning is utterly 
laughable, a running joke in constitutional law circles.”). 
 6. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on 
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing the mixed messages and 
unexplained reasoning of Roe v. Wade).  
 7. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other 
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1973) (discussing the 
Court’s broad and innovative use of substantive due process). 
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decision. Some of these well-known errors are still notable on a 
fresh read. 
First, it is still striking how poor the opinion is, on so many 
levels. I will briefly discuss some of the most obvious examples. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
The Court’s treatment of substantive due process is startlingly 
shoddy. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”9 Although this clause 
sounds “procedural,” the Court has long used the doctrine of 
substantive due process to “hold[] unconstitutional state statutes 
that violate a ‘liberty’ interest the Court believes is protected by 
the clause, regardless of the manner in which the deprivation 
occurs.”10 This doctrine, “which affords constitutional protection to 
individual rights claims without a clear textual warrant,”11 has 
long been controversial.12  
The Court had rejected all substantive review under the Due 
Process Clause as recently as 1963. In Ferguson v. Skrupa,13 eight 
Justices of the Supreme Court rejected any substantive review of 
legislation under the Due Process Clause.14 In Ferguson, Justice 
Black stated: 
                                                                                                     
 8. See generally Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme 
Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973) (addressing a number of 
“fundamental errors” in Roe v. Wade). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 10. Richard S. Myers, The End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 557, 557 n.1 (1988) [hereinafter Myers, Due Process].  
 11. Id. at 557. 
 12. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due 
Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (criticizing 
contemporary attempts to use originalism to support modern substantive due 
process doctrine); Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul II, Freedom, and 
Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61, 62–77 (2007) [hereinafter Myers, 
Pope John Paul II] (discussing this controversy). 
 13. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).  
 14. See id. at 730 (noting that use of the Due Process Clause to hold 
legislative acts unconstitutional when the Court believes “the legislature has 
acted unwisely” had been discarded). 
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The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, 
Burns, and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to 
hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has 
acted unwisely—has long since been discarded. We have 
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do 
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment 
of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. . . . It is now 
settled that States “have power to legislate against what are 
found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and 
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some 
specific federal constitutional prohibition, or some valid federal 
law.15 
Despite that 1963 ruling, the modern era of substantive due 
process began just two years later in 1965 with the Court’s 
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,16 although the Court could not 
bring itself to actually endorse the doctrine.17 In his concurring 
opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice Stewart stated: “[i]n view of what 
had been so recently stated in Skrupa, the Court’s opinion in 
Griswold understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for 
decision.”18 But in 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Court did forthrightly 
accept the doctrine of substantive due process.19 
The Court’s acceptance of the doctrine of substantive due 
process in Roe, though, was almost casual. The Court did not even 
bother to explain why the Due Process Clause had a substantive 
component.20 Even if one accepted the doctrine of substantive due 
                                                                                                     
 15. Id. at 730–31 (quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal 
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)); see also Myers, Due Process, supra note 10, at 
560–61 (discussing Ferguson v. Skrupa). 
 16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 17. See id. at 482 (declining to analyze the right of privacy under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 19. See id. at 153  
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District court determined, in the 
Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy. 
 20. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (declining to analyze the right of privacy 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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process, the Court’s explanation for why the choice of an abortion 
is protected by that doctrine as a fundamental liberty is shockingly 
weak.21 The Court, without a hint of irony, even invoked Justice 
Holmes’s dissent in Lochner in which Holmes noted the need for 
judicial restraint.22 The Court concluded that a “right of privacy” 
does exist under the Constitution.23 The Court rejected the claim 
“that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one 
pleases, . . . ”24 but “the Court provide[d] neither an alternative 
definition [of the general constitutional right involved] nor an 
account of why it [thought] privacy [was] involved.”25 The Roe 
Court did mention that the right of personal privacy “has some 
extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education . . . .”26 As John Ely noted, in the end, the Court “simply 
announces that the right to privacy ‘is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.’”27 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that 
deciding whether the right involved is “fundamental” is usually the most 
important inquiry in substantive due process cases).  
 22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. Justice Blackmun expressed the need for the 
Court “to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and 
predilection.” Id. Justice Blackmun later noted:  
We bear in mind, too, Justice Holmes’ admonition in his now-
vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905): 
[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and 
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States. 
Id. at 117. Professor Epstein’s comment hit the nail on the head: “Anyone can 
quote Holmes in Lochner v. New York. But not everyone can apply the Holmes 
doctrine when his views are not embodied in the legislation under review.” 
Epstein, supra note 7, at 168 (footnote omitted). 
 23. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 24. Id. at 154. 
 25. Ely, supra note 6, at 931. 
 26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (citations omitted). 
 27. Ely, supra note 6, at 932 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153). 
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2. History 
The Court’s treatment of the history of abortion is an 
embarrassment. That treatment seemed designed to show that 
there had been some sort of a historical recognition of a right to an 
abortion. For example, Justice Blackmun stated: 
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the 
adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion 
of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than 
under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it 
another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to 
terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.28  
Many scholars have refuted the historical analysis in Roe v. 
Wade.29 As John Keown stated: “Roe was a radical break with the 
law’s historical protection of the unborn child and thereby with its 
adherence to the principle of the inviolability of human life.”30 In 
sum, despite the efforts of Justice Blackmun to argue to the 
contrary, “Roe’s invention of a constitutional right to abortion 
represented a radical rejection of America’s long-standing history 
and traditions.”31  
3. The Treatment of the Unborn in Other Areas of the Law 
The Court’s treatment of how the unborn are regarded in 
other areas of the law was fundamentally flawed. An accurate 
account would have undermined the Court’s conclusions. Robert 
Byrn noted: “It is evident that the Court’s errors in [Roe v.] Wade 
                                                                                                     
 28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140.  
 29. See generally JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF 
ABORTION HISTORY (2006) (discussing the legal history of abortion in England 
and America and addressing Justice Blackmun’s conclusions); Byrn, supra note 
8, at 813–14 (addressing a number of “fundamental errors” in Roe v. Wade); 
John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s 
History and Traditions, 22 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 3, 4 (2006) (questioning Justice 
Blackmun’s conclusion and the historical claims in Roe v. Wade); James S. 
Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 29, 28–47 (1985) (discussing the 
historical and medical foundations of Roe v. Wade).  
 30. Keown, supra note 29, at 5 (footnote omitted). 
 31. Id. at 37.  
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are cumulative. From a distorted interpretation of the common law 
on abortion to a general misunderstanding of the status of the 
unborn in American law, the Court erected a flimsy house of cards, 
piling one error upon another.”32 Moreover, the Court ignored the 
fact that, as Richard Epstein noted, “recent judicial trends have 
expanded, not limited,”33 the rights of the unborn. 
4. Personhood 
The Court’s treatment of the personhood issue was also 
incredibly weak. The Court held “that the word ‘person’, as used in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”34 The 
easiest way to understand the weakness of the Court’s treatment 
of the personhood issue is to compare the Roe opinion with the 
recent seventy-page article by Michael Paulsen entitled The 
Plausibility of Personhood.35 Paulsen concludes that “the clear 
plausibility of personhood suggests at the very least that Roe—on 
this point as on so many others—is indefensible.”36 
5. The Origins and Value of Human Life 
The Court’s treatment of the origins and value of human life is 
also incredibly weak.37 The Court explained that it did not really 
                                                                                                     
 32. Byrn, supra note 8, at 849. 
 33. Epstein, supra note 7, at 175; see also Ely, supra note 6, at 925 (noting 
that the Court’s reliance on certain doctrines regarding the protection of fetuses 
undercuts, rather than supports, its conclusion). 
 34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (footnote omitted).  
 35. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 13, 14 (2012) (considering the legal personhood status of a living human 
fetus in utero). 
 36. Id. at 72. 
 37. For an excellent academic critique of the Court’s efforts in this regard, 
see Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 31 (2013) (discussing the viability rule); Randy Beck, 
Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249 (2009) 
(discussing the development of the viability rule from Roe to Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)); Randy 
Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 
713 (2007) (discussing the “rethinking” of viability in Planned Parenthood of 
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need to decide the issue of when life begins.38 Yet, the Court did 
decide the question,39 because as Joe Grano noted “the Court 
necessarily rejected the legislative judgment that fetal life 
deserves protection.”40 In the Court’s judgment, the unborn did not 
have any interest that the mother or the state was bound to 
respect. And here my allusion to Dred Scott is intentional.41   
B. De-emphasis on Women’s Rights 
Second, the Court’s de-emphasis of abortion as a matter of a 
woman’s right is striking. That point was made in the Greenhouse 
comment I noted above. Greenhouse stated: “To read the actual 
opinion, as almost no one ever does, is to understand that the 
seven middle-aged to elderly men in the majority certainly didn’t 
think they were making a statement about women’s rights: women 
and their voices are nearly absent from the opinion.”42 That aspect 
of the decision has long been noted43 but it is still rather 
remarkable. The Court’s summary of its holding ignores the 
woman’s interest almost entirely. The Court noted in the first 
trimester that “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
                                                                                                     
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).   
 38. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (“We need not resolve the difficult question of 
when life begins.”). 
 39. See Myers, Due Process, supra note 10, at 610 (“According to Justice 
White’s approach, for example, it is a serious mistake to regard Roe v. Wade as 
advancing a neutral position on the issue of abortion.”). 
 40. Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a 
Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 24 (1981).  
 41. See Myers, Due Process, supra note 10, at 563 n.38 (noting the 
connection to the philosophy underlying the Dred Scott case); Paulsen, supra 
note 5, at 1018 (noting the close affinity of the pro-choice philosophical 
argument with the moral stance of Dred Scott). 
 42. Greenhouse, supra note 2.  
 43. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (discussing the 
role of women in the Roe decision); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984) (attempting to articulate a 
constitutional concept of sex-based equality).  
RE-READING ROE V. WADE 1033 
 
physician.”44 After viability, the abortion decision is again assigned 
to “appropriate medical judgment.”45  
Here is the Court’s conclusion of the portion of the opinion 
summarizing the holding: The decision vindicates the right of 
the physician to administer medical treatment according to his 
professional judgment up to the points where important state 
interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up 
to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic 
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.46  
The errors in this thinking are obvious. As Richard Epstein stated 
long ago: 
[The Court’s] result does not seem to be a fair implication of the 
right of privacy, the only suggested basis for the decision. The 
privacy to be protected must be that of the pregnant woman and 
not that of some attending physician. . . . [Moreover,] [i]t is 
either pretense or folly to assume that the decision to have an 
abortion will be made for the most part by physicians on the 
basis of ‘their best medical judgment.’ . . . [In nearly every 
instance,] there is no medical question, and hence no place for 
medical judgment.47 
This is not to say that Roe would have been a sound decision if it 
had forthrightly addressed whether women (as opposed to their 
physicians) had a constitutional right to an abortion; the focus on 
physicians in Justice Blackmun’s opinion is, though, further 
evidence of the disingenuousness of the opinion. 
C. Eugenics 
Third, the eugenic statements in Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
are noteworthy. In one of the earliest sentences in the opinion, 
Justice Blackmun noted that “population growth, pollution, 
poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify 
                                                                                                     
 44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  
 45. Id. at 165.  
 46. Id. at 165–66.  
 47. Epstein, supra note 7, at 181 (footnotes omitted).  
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the problem.”48 His conclusion emphasized that the Court’s holding 
was consistent “with the demands of the profound problems of the 
present day.”49 While Justice Blackmun did not explicitly endorse 
the ugly, eugenic history of the demand for abortion rights,50 re-
reading those statements is instructive. The issue surfaced in 2009 
in comments made by Justice Ginsburg who stated: “Frankly I had 
thought that at the time Roe was decided, there was concern about 
population growth and particularly growth in populations that we 
do not want to have too many of.”51 Justice Ginsburg’s comments 
created a firestorm,52 and three years later she made some 
clarifying comments53 that did very little to allay the concerns that 
many had about her comments.54  
                                                                                                     
 48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.  
 49. Id. at 165.  
 50. See, e.g., Mary Meehan, How Eugenics and Population Control Led to 
Abortion, MEEHAN REPORTS (last updated Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.meehan 
reports.com/how-led.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (detailing the role of 
eugenics in the development of legal abortions) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 51. See Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, MAG. 
(July 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/magazine/12gins burg-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (interviewing Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. See Dan Gilgoff, Does Ruth Bader Ginsburg Support Eugenics?, U.S. 
NEWS (July 14, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/god-and-country/2009/ 
07/14/does-ruth-bader-ginsburg-support-eugenics (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) 
(discussing Justice Ginsburg’s comment in the New York Times Magazine) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jonah Goldberg, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and a Question of Eugenics, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 15, 2009, 12:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227883/ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-
question-eugenics/jonah-goldberg (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing Justice 
Ginsburg’s comment in the New York Times Magazine and the historical 
eugenics movement in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 53. See Emily Bazelon, Talking to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SLATE 
(Oct. 19, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/10/ruth_bader_ginsburg_clears_up_her_views_on_abortion_
population_control_and.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (clarifying Justice 
Ginsburg’s comments on abortion and eugenics) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 54. See Ben Johnson, Justice Ginsburg Backpedals After Advocating 
Abortion to Reduce Unwanted Populations: Report, LIFESITE NEWS (Oct. 22, 
2012), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/justice-ginsburg-reportedly-backpedal 
s-from-controversial-population-contro/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (criticizing 
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The eugenics aspects of this issue are complex,55 but 
revealing.56 Eugenics typically involves efforts to improve the 
human species, and often involves efforts to eliminate the unfit.57 
(It is worth recalling Justice Holmes’s statement from Buck v. 
Bell58 that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”59) These 
efforts carry with them a rejection of the idea that human beings 
have equal dignity.60 They reject the traditional Western sanctity 
of life ethic and focus rather on quality of life.61 That is why some 
have expressed concerns about some phrases in Justice 
                                                                                                     
Justice Ginsburg’s clarifying statements in the Slate article) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control 
and Reproductive Justice (Sept. 17, 2012) (unpublished St. Louis U. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2012-26), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148055 
(discussing the historical context of race and abortion) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Professor Ziegler recognizes the linkages 
between population control efforts and the push for abortion rights but cautions 
against simply equating the views of population control advocates and more 
modern advocates of abortion rights who emphasize women’s rights. I agree 
with her that it is not appropriate to argue that every person who favored the 
legalization of abortion (or who now is in favor of the right to abortion) is in 
favor of population control or eugenics. My broader point, though, is a 
theoretical point: as explained in the text, there is a linkage between eugenics 
and those who favor abortion rights: both deny the idea of basic human equality. 
 56. It is clear that population control efforts played an important role in 
the push for abortion rights. See CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE 57–60 (2013) (discussing the role of 
population control in the deregulation of abortion); John Keown, Eugenics and 
the Law, in THE NEW FRONTIERS OF GENETICS AND THE RISK OF EUGENICS: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ASSEMBLY OF THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE 2009, 
111–15 (J. Lafitte & I. Carrasco de Paula eds., 2010) (discussing the linkage 
between eugenics and the efforts to legalize abortion in England).  
 57. See John C. Berry, Eugenics, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIAL POLICY: SUPPLEMENT 103, 103–07 
(Michael L. Coulter, Richard S. Myers & Joseph A. Varacalli eds. 2012) (defining 
the term eugenics and discussing its development). 
 58. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 59. Id. at 207. 
 60. See Keown, supra note 56, at 115 (noting that laws protecting against 
homicide or the killing of human beings recognize the equality in dignity of 
human beings). 
 61. See John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From ‘Sanctity of Life’ to 
‘Quality of Life’ and ‘Autonomy’, in ISSUES FOR A CATHOLIC BIOETHIC 233, 233–60 
(Luke Gormally ed., 1999) (discussing the distinction between “sanctity of life” 
and “quality of life” and its historical development). 
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Blackmun’s opinion in Roe.62 Justice Blackmun’s opinion contained 
the following infamous passage: “In short, the unborn have never 
been regarded in the law as persons in the whole sense.”63 The 
Court’s subsequent statement just a few paragraphs later in 
support of its viability line of reasoning—that viability was the 
point at which “the fetus then presumably has the capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”64—further supported 
the charge that the Court was adopting a “quality of life” 
orientation.65 So, the stakes here are quite large.66 
D. Caution Is Surprising in Majority Opinion 
Fourth, the Court’s cautious, diffident approach is surprising. 
For example, the Court, as I mentioned above,67 invoked (with 
                                                                                                     
 62. See infra notes 65–66 (discussing the “quality of life” orientation). 
 63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 64. Id. at 163; see also supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text 
(discussing the analysis of viability in Roe v. Wade). 
 65. See Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws 
Banning Suicide from the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 771, 782–83 (1995) [hereinafter Myers, Constitutionality] 
(discussing this theme and its risks); Byrn, supra note 8, at 857–61 (discussing 
the “dangerous implications” of Roe v. Wade).  
 66. Then-Cardinal Ratzinger describes these risks clearly: 
One understands, then, how a state which arrogates to itself the 
prerogative of defining which human beings are or are not the subject 
of rights and which consequently grants to some the power to violate 
others’ fundamental right to life, contradicts the democratic ideal to 
which it continues to appeal and undermines the very foundations on 
which it is built. By allowing the rights of the weakest to be violated, 
the state also allows the law of force to prevail over the force of law. 
One sees, then, that the idea of an absolute tolerance of freedom of 
choice for some destroys the very foundation of a just life for men 
together. The separation of politics from any natural content of right, 
which is the inalienable patrimony of everyone's moral conscience, 
deprives social life of its ethical substance and leaves it defenseless 
before the will of the strongest. 
Joseph Ratzinger, The Problem of Threats to Human Life, CATHOLIC CULTURE 
(Apr. 8, 1991), http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?id=187 
&repos=1&subrepos=&searchid=292732 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Holmes’s 
dissent in Lochner v. New York).  
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approval) Justice Holmes’s famous comment in his dissent in 
Lochner in which Holmes stated that “[the Constitution] is made 
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our 
finding certain opinions natural or familiar or novel and even 
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question 
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States.”68 Yet, Justice Rehnquist noted that “while the 
Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in 
Lochner v. New York, the result it reaches is more closely attuned 
to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case.”69 The 
Court’s false gesture of humility with regard to the origins of 
human life is similar.70 These statements were a complete 
smokescreen but they did seem to reflect a Court that was uneasy 
about its role. Of course, that feature of Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion-writing was all gone by the time of his subsequent opinions 
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services71 and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.72 
E. Dissents Are Weak 
Fifth, it is a bit surprising to note the weakness of the 
dissents. As John Hart Ely noted just after the decisions, “[w]ere 
the dissents adequate, this comment would be unnecessary. But 
each is so brief as to signal no particular conviction that Roe 
represents an important, or unusually dangerous, constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 68. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173–74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 70. The Court stated:  
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When 
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, 
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at 
this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position 
to speculate as to the answer.  
Id. at 159 (majority opinion). This was, of course, false, for the Court did in fact 
decide the issue (as a legal matter). See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Court’s default decision regarding when life begins). 
 71. 492 U.S. 490, 537–60 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 72. 505 U.S. 833, 922–43 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  
1038 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1025 (2014) 
 
development.”73 The dissents, by Justices White and Rehnquist, do 
contain some effective points and some of the stronger passages in 
those opinions are still quoted today. For example, Justice White 
noted that “[t]he Court simply fashions and announces a new 
constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any 
reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient 
substance to override most existing state abortion statutes.”74 His 
critique of the activism of the Court’s opinion was also made 
effectively. In perhaps the most-quoted portion of the dissents, 
Justice White noted: “As an exercise of raw judicial power, the 
Court perhaps has the authority to do what it does today; but in 
my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise 
of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this 
Court.”75 But on the whole the dissents were weak and did not do 
justice to the magnitude of the Court’s decisions or to the issues 
involved.76 It is interesting to imagine the dissent that Justice 
Scalia might have written had he been on the Court in 1973.77 
III. Lessons from a Re-reading of Roe v. Wade 
In this section of the Article, I will offer some reflections on the 
principal lessons that can be learned from a re-reading of Roe. 
First, one of the strongest impressions one gets from re-
reading Roe v. Wade is of the weakness of Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion. That point—the weakness of Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion—is well understood, but it is even more striking on a fresh 
                                                                                                     
 73. Ely, supra note 6, at 920 n.3; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Comments from the Contributors, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE 
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 
239 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (describing the inadequacies of the dissents to 
Roe v. Wade).  
 74. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221–22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 222. 
 76. See Paulsen, supra note 73, at 239 (describing the inadequacies of the 
dissents to Roe v. Wade). 
 77. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1022 (comparing the Roe dissents to 
Justice Scalia’s “impassioned dissents” in Casey); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–
1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining thoroughly his disagreement with the Casey decision).  
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reading of the opinion. I think that is an important reason for 
believing that Roe will ultimately be overturned. The judicial 
rationale for a nearly unlimited right to an abortion was deeply 
flawed from the outset. That has become clearer with the passage 
of years. Advocates for the right to an abortion have been re-
writing the opinion for years in an effort to place the decision on a 
firmer foundation.78 These efforts have floundered over the years 
and that too (the realization that no one alternative explanation 
has really taken hold) suggests that Roe v. Wade will eventually be 
overturned.  
Second, the continuing controversy about Roe (this 
Symposium is just one of many examples), which is driven in part 
by the easy target that the opinion presents, indicates that Roe is 
still in play.79 I do not think we reflect often enough about how 
unusual that is.80 In other areas of constitutional law, we do not 
often encounter this sort of ongoing critique of decisions that are, 
in theory, settled law. So, for example, the sex discrimination 
decisions of the Burger Court in the early- and mid-1970s 
(precisely the time of Roe v. Wade) were enormously 
controversial.81 These decisions made significant changes in equal 
                                                                                                     
 78. See generally WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. 
Balkin ed., 2005) (collecting comments and re-written opinions of how Roe 
should have been decided). 
 79. Although Roe was modified in some respects by Casey, the right to 
abortion was not drastically cut back, as is sometimes claimed. See infra note 88 
and accompanying text (discussing how Casey modified Roe). The main import of 
Roe (that there is a right to abortion at any point during pregnancy for any 
reason) is still the law. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how 
Casey modified Roe); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 996 n.4 (discussing the larger 
differences between Casey and Roe in detail). 
 80. This next paragraph is drawn from an earlier article of mine. See 
Richard S. Myers, A Comment on ‘The Constitutional Law and Politics of 
Reproductive Rights’, in LIFE AND LEARNING XXII: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWENTY-SECOND UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE (Joseph W. 
Koterski ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150236 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict 
and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1323, 1323 (2006) (exploring how equal protection doctrine relating to sex 
discrimination was forged through social movement conflicts during the time of 
the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment).  
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protection law. The Court elevated the level of scrutiny it used in 
sex discrimination cases from the lowest level of scrutiny to a form 
of heightened scrutiny that resulted in the invalidation of many 
laws that contained classifications based on sex.82 These decisions 
were criticized as examples of judicial activism. There was little 
support for the Court’s approach in the text, history, or prior 
judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
decisions came at a time of sweeping cultural changes on matters 
of sexual equality. Yet, today there is almost no controversy at all 
about these decisions. The Court’s decisions are widely accepted.83 
No one holds conferences reassessing Craig v. Boren.84  
The contrast with Roe v. Wade could not be more striking.85 
Roe was controversial in 1973 and it is still controversial. In 
addition to the withering critiques of Roe as an exercise of 
constitutional interpretation, there is the profoundly significant 
matter that Roe has not been accepted in the broader culture.86 
Moreover, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for 
Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
953, 953–56 (1996) (providing a brief history of the Supreme Court’s 
development of the standard of review for analyzing sex discrimination). 
 83. See Siegel, supra note 81, at 1335 (“The core precepts of sex 
discrimination law are now canonical.”). 
 84. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (determining that sex discrimination was subject to 
intermediate scrutiny).  
 85. This next paragraph is drawn from an earlier paper of mine. See Myers, 
supra note 80, at 9 (discussing the contrast with Roe v. Wade). 
 86. See FORSYTHE, supra note 56, at 289–309 (noting broad agreement in 
American culture about the issue of abortion); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. 
Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should be Returned to 
the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 164–67 (2005) (discussing the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence and public opinion). In his recent book, Clarke Forsythe 
summarized the point in this fashion:  
What makes abortion uniquely controversial is that the Justices have 
sided with a small sect—7 percent of Americans—who support 
abortion for any reason at any time. And the Justices have for forty 
years prevented the 60–70 percent of Americans in the middle from 
deciding differently. The conflict between public opinion and the 
Supreme Court’s nationwide policy is one key reason why Roe is 
uniquely controversial.  
FORSYTHE, supra note 56, at 296.  
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Casey87 is not really accepted either.88 There is constant resistance 
to Roe v. Wade among judges,89 legislators,90 academics,91 and in 
the broader culture.92 Increasing pro-life sentiment makes it clear 
that Roe and Casey are not sufficiently well accepted to remove the 
issue from broader public debate. Roe and Casey have not been 
accepted, or at least not to the degree of the Court’s sex 
discrimination decisions from the same era.93 
Third, a re-reading of Roe v. Wade prompts the realization 
that the decision is not in reality the landmark that its reputation 
would seem to suggest. Roe was, in certain respects, a momentous 
                                                                                                     
 87. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 88. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 86, at 164–67 (discussing the 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence and public opinion). Casey did modify Roe in 
certain respects but the degree of the changes was not as dramatic as some 
suggest. Casey itself stated that it preserved “the central holding of Roe v. 
Wade.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. Under Casey, states have more freedom to 
regulate abortion but still no power to prohibit abortion at any point during 
pregnancy. See generally Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Twentieth 
Anniversary of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in LIFE AND LEARNING XXII: THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE 
CONFERENCE (Joseph W. Koterski ed.) (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2150241 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 737–47 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., 
concurring specially) (noting the deficiencies in Roe v. Wade’s emphasis on 
viability in a case addressing wrongful death).   
 90. There continues to be legislative efforts to limit abortion rights in the 
states. See Dave Andrusko, A Snapshot of the Status of Pro-Life Legislation in 
the States, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nationalright 
tolifenews.org/news/2012/03/a-snapshot-of-the-status-of-pro-life-legislation-in-
the-states/#.UtbzGLSPXlU (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing various 
legislative attempts to restrict abortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 91. The proceedings from the annual conferences of University Faculty for 
Life are good examples. See UFL Life and Learning Conferences Past 
Proceedings, UNIV. FACULTY FOR LIFE, http://www.uffl.org/pastproceedings.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (providing links to materials and presentations given 
at the yearly conference) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 92. See Michael New, Additional Gallup Data Proves America Trending 
Strongly Pro-Life, LIFENEWS.COM (June 14, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://www.life 
news.com/2012/06/14/additional-gallup-data-proves-america-trending-strongly-
pro-life/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing a recent survey that showed a 
significant decrease in pro-choice sentiment) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 93. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing the broad 
acceptance of the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination decisions). 
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decision. It has had an enormous impact in opening the door to a 
staggering number of abortions over the last forty years. Of course, 
many of these abortions would have happened without Roe, but it 
is important and tragic that these over 50 million abortions94 have 
occurred with the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court.  
But Roe has always seemed more than that. In reality, 
however, the opinion is an outlier. That is true in many areas. 
Although women still have a nearly unlimited right to an abortion, 
in many other areas of the law, unborn children have increasingly 
been accorded legal protection. The federal Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act (and various state counterparts)95 and the federal 
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act96 are two important examples. 
The Alabama Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Ankrom97 is 
another prominent example. In that case, the court held that 
Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute protected unborn 
children.98 Justice Parker’s special concurrence concluded 
The decision of this Court today is in keeping with the 
widespread legal recognition that unborn children are persons 
with rights that should be protected by law. Today, the only 
major area in which unborn children are denied legal protection 
is abortion, and that denial is only because of the dictates of Roe 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Steven Ertelt, 55,772,015 Abortions in America Since Roe v. Wade 
in 1973, LIFENEWS.COM (Jan. 18, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/ 
01/18/55772015-abortions-in-america-since-roe-vs-wade-in-1973/ (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing a study detailing the number of abortions performed 
since 1973) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012); see also Unborn Victims of Violence (Fetal 
Homicide), NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/federal/unbornvictims/ (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2014) (providing links to documents on federal and state 
legislation punishing harm to unborn victims) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 96. 1 U.S.C. § 8; see also Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, NAT’L RIGHT TO 
LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/federal/bornaliveinfants/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) 
(providing links to documents on the federal Act) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 97. Case Nos. 1110176, 1110219, 2013 Ala. LEXIS 8 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
 98. See id. at *60 (“[The] Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that the 
plain meaning of the word ‘child’ in the chemical-endangerment statute includes 
an unborn child . . . [and we] reject the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reasoning 
insofar as it limits the application of the chemical-endangerment statute to a 
viable unborn child.”). 
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[v. Wade.] Roe has become increasingly isolated on this point, as 
on many others. 99  
Roe is thought of, along with Griswold v. Connecticut,100 as 
representative of the modern approach to substantive due process. 
Yet, here too Roe is somewhat of an outlier. It seemed that Roe and 
Casey might support a fundamental right to assisted suicide,101 but 
in Washington v. Glucksberg102 the Supreme Court rejected that 
expansion of substantive due process, in part it seemed because 
the Court was reticent about constitutionalizing another area of 
social life.103 And more importantly the Court in Glucksberg set 
forth an approach to substantive due process that amounted to a 
rejection of the approach the Court had used in Roe v. Wade.104 As 
I noted in a prior article, “Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion [in 
Glucksberg] was all about judicial restraint and deference to 
history and tradition.”105 The notable exception to this analysis is 
the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,106 in which the Court 
held unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual 
sodomy.107 Lawrence though, despite its expansive language, was 
modest in the sense that the Court was invalidating a law that 
existed in only a relative handful of states. Lawrence, as scholars 
such as Cass Sunstein have noted,108 is similar in this respect to 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at *89 (Parker, J., concurring specially).  
 100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 101. See Richard S. Myers, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Current Legal 
Perspective, 1 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 345, 346–48 (2001) (discussing the 
broad language of rights in Roe and Casey). 
 102. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 103. See id. at 719–23 (finding that a protection to commit suicide is not 
included in the Due Process Clause and that to find such a thing would reverse 
“centuries of legal doctrine and practice”). 
 104. See Myers, supra note 101, at 349 (comparing the Court’s analysis in 
Glucksberg to that in Roe and Casey). 
 105. Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 66 (footnote omitted). 
 106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 107. See id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest 
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1524 (2008) (discussing how “activist” the 
Griswold decision was in comparison to Roe); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After 
Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1062–63 (2004) (discussing the concept of 
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Griswold v. Connecticut in which the Court struck down a law that 
existed in only one state in the Union.109 Roe, in which the Court 
effectively invalidated the abortion laws of every state, is 
exceptional.110 Moreover, Lawrence is in many respects more 
reflective of the importance of equality than it is a full 
endorsement of individual autonomy,111 although there is of course 
language in Lawrence to support the autonomy reading.112 And 
Lawrence, despite the predictions of Justice Scalia’s dissent, has 
not led to a wholesale invalidation of morals legislation.113  
Fourth, as noted above, from a perspective of forty years, Roe’s 
almost complete neglect of equality themes is striking. As 
suggested in my discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, that is where the 
action is today. It is intriguing that the discussion about same-sex 
marriage has primarily been about “marriage equality” and not 
about a right to marriage.114 I think that is in part because we 
seem to lack the moral vocabulary to discuss basic moral issues 
directly. I think this focus on equality suggests the importance of 
pro-life efforts to focus on and to prevent the harms to women from 
abortion,115 and on efforts to combat the equality arguments in 
                                                                                                     
desuetude, of laws lapsing over time, and comparing Griswold and Lawrence on 
this ground).  
 109. See Calabresi, supra note 108, at 1525 (noting that Lawrence, like 
Griswold, changed very few state laws). 
 110. See id. at 1524 (“Whereas Griswold struck down the law of one state, a 
law which was not even being enforced, Roe struck down the abortion laws of all 
fifty states.”). 
 111. See Myers, supra note 88, at 13 (noting an expansive understanding of 
liberty in Lawrence). 
 112. See id. at 12 (discussing Justice Scalia’s prediction regarding the end of 
all morals legislation); Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 74–77 
(discussing the “moral relativism” of Lawrence). 
 113. See Myers, supra note 88, at 12 (discussing Justice Scalia’s prediction 
regarding the end of all morals legislation); Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra 
note 12, at 74–77 (discussing the “moral relativism” of Lawrence). 
 114. It is noteworthy that the early challenges to the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, see, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005), prominently featured arguments that bans on same-sex marriage 
violated the right to marry. By the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the arguments were nearly 
exclusively framed in terms of equal protection.  
 115. See FORSYTHE, supra note 56, at 245–68 (discussing the danger that an 
abortion poses to a woman’s health); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and 
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favor of abortion rights.116 The equality arguments in favor of 
abortion rights (which have surfaced in certain judicial opinions 
and in the literature) are not securely rooted in the text of the 
Constitution or in established legal doctrine.117 In addition, efforts 
to ban abortion for reasons of sex selection also may be important 
because they turn this equality argument against the right to an 
abortion.118 Moreover, the reaction of abortion rights advocates to 
efforts to ban abortion for reasons of sex selection indicates that 
the issue is more about autonomy (about the power to make 
decisions) and not about equality. When faced with a conflict 
between equality and autonomy, autonomy wins every time. 
Fifth, the Court’s relatively cursory treatment of the origins 
and value of human life is noteworthy and creates an opening.119 
The Court’s humility in claiming that it “need not resolve the 
difficult question of when life begins[,]”120 was obviously false. But 
this false gesture of humility may make it easier for people to 
avoid the reality that abortion takes the life of a human being. As 
Michael Paulsen has stated: 
I doubt that more than a small percentage of Americans, if 
pressed on the point, would dispute the fact that abortion is the 
                                                                                                     
Abortion: The Implications of Gonzales v. Carhart, in LIFE AND LEARNING XVII: 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE 
CONFERENCE 103, 123–24 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 2008) (discussing the role of 
equality in the campaign for abortion rights). 
 116. For a general discussion of this theme (from a pro-abortion rights 
perspective), see Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for 
Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 160 (2013). 
 117. See Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection 
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 896–907 (2011) 
(discussing the connection between the right to equality and the right to an 
abortion); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1009–11 n.35 (detailing the lack of a 
connection between equal protection jurisprudence and the language and 
meaning of the constitutional text); Mary Catherine Wilcox, Note, Why the 
Equal Protection Clause Cannot “Fix” Abortion Law, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 
307 (2008) (discussing whether equal protection arguments will be successful in 
striking down abortion regulations).  
 118. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1010 n.35 (discussing instances where the 
pro-abortion reasoning may be controverted). 
 119. For an extensive treatment of the issue, see, for example, ROBERT P. 
GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE (2d ed. 
2011) (arguing “that embryonic human beings deserve full moral respect”). 
 120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
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killing of a human life in its prenatal state and that, outside of a 
few truly extreme situations, such killing is morally 
unjustifiable. But nobody really wants to be pressed on the 
point.121 
For those opposed to the Roe v. Wade decision, it is important to 
continue to make the scientific and moral case for the protection of 
the unborn.122 This is why efforts such as ultrasound laws are so 
important.123 Even efforts that do not purport to save many lives, 
such as bans on partial birth abortion and bans on abortion for 
reasons of fetal pain, may help to serve an educational function.124 
Efforts to build a reverence for the value of human life in other 
areas—such as in debates about assisted suicide or infanticide—
are also important.125  
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, the overwhelming sense that comes through a re-
reading of Roe is that Justice Blackmun authored an incredibly 
weak opinion. I think that portends the decision’s ultimate 
reversal. The Supreme Court and the American system do have 
the capacity for self-correction and the deep flaws in the key case 
establishing a nearly unlimited right to an abortion suggest that 
the ultimate reversal of Roe v. Wade is likely. 
                                                                                                     
 121. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1041. 
 122. See, e.g., GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN, supra note 119, at 1−25 (detailing the 
importance of understanding that a human being is a human being from the 
beginning of development). 
 123. See Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right 
to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 595, 595 (2012) (discussing a split between courts about the 
constitutionality of various state statutes requiring display and explanation of 
an ultrasound to a woman prior to an abortion). 
 124. See Myers, supra note 115, at 122 (discussing this aspect of bans on 
partial birth abortion). 
 125. See Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Terri-Schindler Schiavo Case, 
in LIFE AND LEARNING XIV; THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH UNIVERSITY 
FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 27, 40–41 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 2005) (noting 
the need to focus on this broader point).  
